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Abstract 
The concept of "humanitarian emer- 
gency" has come to be largely synony- 
mous with contemporary refugee 
situations. The purposeof this paper is to 
critically explore theconnections between 
the categorization of rtfugeesasan "emer- 
gency" situation and the way in which 
"humanitarianism" has come to consti- 
tutea hegemonic discourse in which aca- 
demics, policy-makzrs, international 
organizations, and refugee advocates 
mus tfirmulate their arguments and ac- 
tions. Humanitarianism is often por- 
trayed as posing a challenge to the codes 
and practices ofstatemeignty because 
it is afirm of action which is purportedly 
motivated by a sense of obligation and 
responsibility to "humanity" that goes 
beyond the responsibility one fee2s for 
fellow citizens. This paper analyzes a se- 
ries of recent UNHCR representations of 
refugees to suggest that humanitarian- 
ism must instead be understood as an in- 
herentlypolitical concept. Drawing upon 
the writings Giorgio Agamben, this pa- 
per demonstrates h humanitarianism 
is always already (bio)political to the 
extent that it relies on a conception of 
"bare human life" which is consistent 
with the practices of state sovereignty. 
From this perspective,framing the r e -  
gee phenomenon as a "humanitarian 
emergency" works tosustain constitutive 
practices which stabilize and reproduce 
statist resolutions toquestions ofpolitical 
identity, community, and world order. 
Leconcept d'uurgence humanitaire* est 
devenu une sortede synonymemu1 de 
usituation contemporainedes rt!jk@s~. 
Le but de cet articleest de proctder h une 
exploration critiquedes liens entre la ca- 
tkgorisa tion du refuge comme situation 
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d'uurgencew et la facon dont l'idde 
d'uhumanitarisme~ en est venue h se 
constituer en discours hdgdmonique, 
dans le cadre duquel les universitaires, 
les ddcideurs, les organisa tions interna- 
tionales, et les dijimdeurs des droits des 
r6fugids se voient obligks de formuler 
leurs arguments et leurs actions. L'hu- 
manitarisme est souvent deeint comme 
posant un dkji aux codes et pratiques de 
la souverainetd des ttats, car c'est une 
forme d'action qui serait mo tivke par un 
sens de la responsabilitd et des obliga- 
tions envers l'uhumanitdw qui outrepas- 
serait les responsabilitb que l'on aurait 
envers ses concitoyens. Leprksent article 
analyse une rkcen te &e de reprksenta- 
tions de r6fugiks du HCR visant a suggd- 
rer que l'humanitarisme devrait plutbt 
itre compris comme in concept fonda- 
mentalement politique. Fondk sur les 
kcritsdeGiorgio Agamben, leprksent ar- 
ticle dhontre comment l'humanita- 
risme est toujours dkjd (bio)politique 
dans la mesure on il se fonde sur une 
conception de la uvie humaine mini- 
malew quiest confomze h2es pratiques des 
dtats souverains. Duns cetteperspective, 
j ; m n u l e r l e p ~ d u  nfugeen terme 
d'uurgence humanitaire~ tend h perpd- 
tuer des pratiques constitutives quistabi- 
lisent et reproduisent la rtsolution 
ttatiste des questions d'identitk politi- 
que, de communautb, d'ordre mondial. 
A Crisis Vocabulary 
The phenomenon of the refugee has a 
long history of being subsumed within 
discourses of crisis and danger. Words 
such as problem, crisis, "complex emer- 
gency," challenge, and controlare com- 
monly invoked when the subject of 
refugees and their movements arise. 
Refugee situations today are usually 
provoked by a complicated configura- 
tion of political, socio-economic, and 
environmental forces which have con- 
joined to create to a crisis situation. The 
suddenness and severity of post-Cold 
War refugee flows has prompted a 
prominent UNHCR official to charac- 
terize these situations as "mega-crises" 
in a statement to the UN Security 
Council (Jessen-Petersen 1998,65). It is 
thereforenot surprising to find that "hu- 
manitarian emergency" has come tobe 
one of the most popular concepts in the 
refugee studies literature, dominating 
the vocabulary of the officials, aid work- 
ers, advocates, academics, and journal- 
ists. The concept attains further 
credibility for the way it connects the 
urgency of crisis situations with a 
heightened sense of moral obligation 
for individuals and groups caught in 
such situations. This emphasis on ethi- 
cal responsibility is especially pertinent 
given the recent changes to the immigra- 
tion and refugee policies of Western 
states, where increased restrictions, 
tightened procedures, and shortened 
time-lines have drastically undercut the 
asylum cultures of these countries 
(Carlier et al., 1997). These changes, 
moreover, come at a time when both the 
number of refugees and crisis situations 
are proliferating. Indeed, the 1.5 million 
refugees the UNHCR recognized in 
1951 had increased to 13.2 million by 
1996, together with an additional 8.5 
million internally displaced persons, 
returnees, and others of concern to the 
agency (UNHCR 1997). The financial 
costs of providing humanitarian assist- 
ance &d to refugees has 
similarly increased: the UNHCR's 
original budget of U.S.$300,000 has 
been dwarfed by recent budgets in ex- 
cess of some U.S.$1.3 billion (Cunliffe 
1995). 
The problem of refugees, however, 
does not lie in their numbers alone. It is 
aproblem, first and foremost, of catego- 
rization, of making distinctions. All 
classifications have social conditions 
for their production and historical 
circumstances which make them cred- 
ible.' However, the immediacy-in- 
deed, the "emergencyn-of refugee 
situations has left little time for critical 
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self-reflection on the conditions and cir- 
cumstances that make such a system of 
discrimination possible. Daniel Warner 
(1995,372) speaks to this point when he 
recalls the reaction of the High Commis- 
sioner of the UNHCR to an academic 
exegesis of refugee discourse: "That 
was allvery well Professor, but what am 
I to do with the problem tomorrow morn- 
ing?" 
One of the enduring consequences of 
being defined in crisis terms is that the 
refugee phenomenon, not surprisingly, 
has been typically incorporated into 
what Robert Cox (1996) has identified 
as "problem solving" discourses-an 
approach which is generally practical 
and operational in nature, and where a 
short-term, crisis-oriented attitude is 
encouraged. As Cox recognized, how- 
ever, the major concern with "problem 
solving" perspectives-and I would 
add, especially when they operate un- 
der the strict temporal constraints im- 
posed by "emergency" situations-is 
that they invariably concentrate their 
attention on the practical ways in 
which order and normalcy can be rein- 
stated. Critical questioning of both the 
unequal power relations and desirabil- 
ity of this order are de-emphasized, 
marginalized, or ignored. Also de-em- 
phasized is any attempt to question the 
role of such key foundational concepts 
as citizenship and state sovereignty. 
Such critical questioning, however, 
seems to be crucial if we are to be in a 
position to identlfy and explain how 
refugees figure into debates about cur- 
rent and possible transformations of 
world order. 
A useful way tobegin such question- 
ing is to think of emergencies as Walter 
Benjamin suggests. In his "Theses on 
the Philosophy of History," Benjamin 
(1968,257) writes: 
The tradition of the oppressed teaches 
us that the "state of emergency" in 
which we live is not the exception but 
the rule. Wemust attainto a conception 
of history that is in keeping with this 
insight. Then we shall clearly realize 
that it is our task to bring about a real 
state of emergency . . . 
Benjamin's diagnosis of the "state of 
emergency" loses none of its relevance 
when it is applied to contemporary 
questions about humanitarianism, 
multilateral cooperation, and the global 
refugee crisis. Situations deemed emer- 
gencies are always interesting for how 
they reveal the often unquestioned and 
undertheorized assumptions about 
what constitutes a "normal" state of 
affairs. Consequently, to think of emer- 
gencies as "not the exception but the 
rule" means paying attention to those 
practices which work to reproduce and 
sustain prevailing conceptions of "nor- 
mality" and "order." 
What, then, is this "normal" state of 
affairs with respect torefugees? A 1939 
review of internationalco-operation on 
the "refugee question" offers aconven- 
tional answer that is still relevant today. 
The author, an international lawyer, 
comments on how the refugeecondition 
should be understood as a temporary 
condition: "The status of the refugee is 
not, of course, a permanent one. The aim 
is that he [sic] should rid himself of that 
status as soon as possible" (Jennings 
1939,98). The lawyer probably felt jus- 
tified in so easily incorporating the 
phrase "of course" into his discussion 
because, as mentioned above, a crisis 
mentality prejudices one toward a 
shortened temporal horizon. His casual 
acceptance, however, can also be inter- 
preted as a claim about the "proper" 
and "enduring" form of political iden- 
tity and community-that is, the citizen 
and the nation-state. It is because the 
refugee is displaced from these "authen- 
tic" identities and communities that she 
is seen as no more than a temporary 
aberration to the norm, a hiccup which 
momentarily disturbs the "national or- 
der of  thing^."^ But to assume that the 
concepts of "citizenship" and "sover- 
eign state" are somehow unproblem- 
atic, foundational principles of modem 
political life is to engage in an act of 
reification which obfuscates the real, 
historical political practices of identity 
and community formation and contes- 
tation (Magnusson 1996). From this 
perspective, state sovereignty is not so 
much a thing, a static juristic principle 
to be invoked, as an effect of various 
practices. As such, state sovereignty 
should not be assumed so much as ex- 
It is not posisible to talk about the state 
as an ontoli$gical beingds  a political 
identity-without engaging in the 
political p actice of constituting the 
state. Put d ifferently, to speak of the 
sovereign tate at all requires one to 
engage in t e political practice of sta- 
bilizing thi t concept's meaning. 
phmed. As 
If conventional perspectives on the 
refugee pheqomenon work according to 
an emergenqy logic that blocks critical 
reflection 00 foundational assump- 
tions, how isthe identity of the refugee 
affectedby sqch a discourse? What con- 
straints and ossibilities exist for indi- 
viduals find k g themselves labelled as 
refugees? In t/henext section I d  exam- 
ine how hqanitarian assumptions 
work to fu+er the aberrant status of 
refugees by examining some recent 
UNHCR vispal representations of the 
refugee condition. 
Cynthia Weber (1995, 3) 
Refugees: 
Emptines , Lack, Silence Re "enti=r 
explains, , 
The first rqpresentation opens the 
UNHCRinmet website of refugeeim- 
ages.3 This $bsite sees itself as provid- 
ing a visual supplement to the rather 
abstract leg4 definitions that are typi- 
cally employed to explain the condition 
of the refuge. As such, its purpose is 
summed upby its titlewhat is it like to 
be arefugeeq The ensuing photographs 
attempt toanpwer this question. And so, 
on one screw we see a Rwandan refugee 
the country with EO,OOO 
same day in April 19%. 
On another, *ere is a photograph of an 
elderly Bosr)ian woman who has be- 
come 'interx+dy displaced' within her 
own commu+ty. These photographs- 
and others r resenting the struggles of 
Tajik, Som$ Vietnamese, and other 
refugees-qflect how the recent prolif- 
eration in rqfugee numbers has been 
matched by unprecedented polymor- 
phism and qomplexity in the causes, 
and effects of glo- 
view- 
ing the visual archive can leave one with 
the sense q a t  no simple or singular 
answer to th+ question of refugee iden- 
tity (or "refukness") is possible. Cur- 
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rent conditions strong1 suggest *at 
the answer to the websit 's initial ques- 
ous, and historical. 
t 
tion must necessarily be filural, ambigu- 
The diversity in the lived experiences 
of the refugees repregented in the 
UNHCR's visual catalo e gives testa- 
ment to the sheer scope d complexity 
of contemporary refuge flows. At the 
same time, however, th f organization 
insists that behind the+ experiences 
born out of particular cobtexts and cir- 
cumstances lies a commbn underlying 
identity which is universally shared 
among all refugees. Th& universalist, 
humanitarian perspectivie is well repre- 
sented in the title page photograph. At 
first, the photograph  see^+^ tobe a rather 
enigmatic choice for a title page repre- 
sentation. Noactualpers+n--refugeeor 
otherwise-can be faun# anywhere in 
the picture. Portrayed r&er is a single 
long-sleeved shirt susperjdedin front of 
a make-shift shelter. Thd shirt, moreo- 
ver, hangs in a way tha produces the 
illusion that a human b y-the body 
of the refugee-is occup ing it. We ex- 
pect to see the refugee, i ut that indi- 
vidual is missing, absdnt, invisible. 
However, the essential humanitarian 
message is clear-the qptiness of the 
shirt signifies the empf/iness that all 
refugees feel when they are forced to 
sever their ties with the$ home. To the 
question "What is it likg to be a refu- 
gee?" the conventional humanitarian 
answer is presented in t$rms of a pro- 
found sense of lack. Like the empty shirt, 
the life of the refugee is typically seen as 
sufferingfromemptine~+~ 
Such a perspective is @so apparent 
in a second UNHCR representation 
found in the organizatioxfs most recent 
report, The S tateofthe WO@S Rejiqees:~ 
Hurnanitatian Agenda (LblHCR 1997, 
50). Each chapter of this pbblication has 
an accompanying photopaph chosen 
for how it compliments ar+d further con- 
veys the chapter's centrd theme. The 
which hold, no doubt, th+ only posses- 
sions the child's family cquld transport 
during the flight from their homes. What 
is most strikingabout the photograph is 
that its subject-the refugee child, 
standingbehind a backlit curtain-can 
only be seen as a shadow. Absent is any 
indication of even the most basic physi- 
cal features-not even the child's gen- 
der can be discerned. What is the 
sigruficance of this? Why would a pho- 
tograph chosen to illuminate the chal- 
lenges of defending refugee rights 
present an anonymous, two-dimen- 
sional outline of a child's human form? 
Liisa Malkki (1996,388) offers an inter- 
esting perspective, suggesting that "the 
visual prominence of women and chil- 
dren asembodiments of refugeeness has 
to do not just with the fact that most 
refugees are women and children, but 
with the institutional, international ex- 
pectation of a certain kind of helpless- 
ness as a refugee characteristic." 
Consequently, just as the openingpho- 
tograph of the UNHCR's website is no- 
table for how it links "refugeeness" 
with invisibility, acorporeality, and 
emptiness, the image of the refugee child 
is striking for how it effaces all traces of 
presence on behalf of refugees when it 
comes to discussing their political and 
social rights. 
These humanitarian images of refu- 
gees, like all representations, cannot be 
expected to convey one thing as another 
without political effect. In a recent arti- 
cle, Malkki demonstrates how humani- 
tarian representations of refugees act as 
an intervening force in world politics. 
Malkki notes how both the mass media 
and the publications of humanitarian 
and international organizations per- 
form such a role, transforming refugees 
into what she calls "speechless emis- 
saries." 
One of the most far-reaching, impor- 
tant consequences of . . . established 
representational practices is the sys- 
tematic, even if unintended, silencing 
of persons who find themselves in the 
classificatory spaceof "refugee."That 
is, refugees suffer from a peculiar kind 
of speechlessness in the face of na- 
tionaland international organizations 
whose object of care and control they 
are. Their accounts are disqualified 
almost a priori, while the languages of 
refugee relief, @cy science, and "de 
velopment" claim the production of 
authoritative narratives about refu- 
gees. (ibid., 386) 
Humanitarian representational 
practices, Malkki argues, attempt to dis- 
turb the common distinction between 
refugees and non-refugees by promot- 
ing a vision of a shared and common 
humanity. Such representations, how- 
ever, often end up portraying an undif- 
ferentiated "raw" or "bare" vision of 
humanity which works to mask the in- 
dividuality of refugees-as well as the 
historical and political circumstances 
which forced them to take this identity. 
Malkki argues that "in their overpower- 
ing philanthropic universalism, in their 
insistence on the secondariness and 
unknowability of details of specific his- 
tories and specific cultural or political 
contexts, such forms of representation 
deny the very particulars that make peo- 
ple something other than anonymous 
bodies, merely human beings" (ibid., 
388-89). 
One of the central difficulties of por- 
traying refugees as "merely human be- 
ings" is that all notions of political 
agency are, in a word, emptied from 
refugee subjectivity. This type of analy- 
sis captures what is at stake politically 
with the refugee phenomenon: refugees 
are silent-or rather, silenced--because 
they do not possess the proper political 
subjectivity (i.e., citizenship) through 
which they can be heard. It is in this 
sense that the assumptions informing 
the humanitarian representations of 
refugees described above correspond to 
a form of discriminations Jacques 
Derrida (1976) has labelled logocentric. 
Briefly, logocentric distinctions are hi- 
erarchically arranged binary opposi- 
tions in which one privileged term 
(logos) provides the orientation for 
interpreting the meaning of the subordi- 
nate term. Refugees have been nega- 
tively defined as registering a two-fold 
lack with respect to the privileged reso- 
lutions to questions of political identity 
(citizenship) and community (nation- 
state). Whereas thecitizen is firmly and 
, securely rooted in the sovereign territo- 
rial spacedf&?state, the refugee suffers 
f r o m d i s p l a c ~ t :  she is uprooted, dis- 
located, an unwilling exile of the com- 
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munity of citizens. Refugees therefore 
sigrufy an emptiness, an incomplete- 
ness vis-bvis the meaningful presence 
to political subjectivity that state citizen- 
ship provides. To rectify this crisis, 
multilateral actions attempt to enact a 
spatial reversal of the binary and trans- 
form this lack into a positive presence. 
Not surprisingly, these "solutions" take 
the form of restoring statist identities 
and communities to refugees in the form 
of voluntary repatriation (i.e.,retuming 
to country of origin) and asylum (i.e., 
settlemmt and integration into another 
country) as well as encouraging multi- 
lateral cooperation on refugee issues. 
Humanitarianism and the 
Politicization of Life 
To say that humanitarian representa- 
tions work to de-politicize refugee iden- 
tity is to at once raise the entire question 
of humanitarianism's relationship to 
politics. In its modem guise humanitar- 
ian action has been consistently prem- 
ised on the principles of humanity, 
impartiality, andneutrality. Pivotal in- 
stances in the spread of these humani- 
tarian principles include Dunant's 
founding of the International Conunit- 
tee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 1863, the 
adoption of the Hague Conventions in 
1907 as well as the Geneva Convention 
of 1949 and its additional protocols of 
1977. The current High Commissioner 
of the UNHCR, Sadako Ogata, empha- 
sizes the contemporary relevance of 
these principles when she insists that 
the creation of "humanitarian space" 
must be "premised on the principles of 
impartiality and neutrality" and be "in- 
dependent from political goals and con- 
sideration~."~ 
The principles of impartiality and 
neutrality, furthermore, gain their force 
from a prior distinction made between 
humanitarianism and politics. It is well 
known, for instance, that the 'humani- 
tarian and social' disposition of the 
UNHCR (stipulated in Article 11 of its 
founding Statute) is articulated only 
after the agency's work is defined as 
"non-political." The president of the 
ICRC puts the issue bluntly in a 1992 
address to the UN General Assembly: 
"humanitarian endeavor and political 
action must go their separate ways if the 
neutrality a .  impartiality of humani- 
tarian work is not be jeopardi~ed."~ 
According to the conventional wis- 
dom, therefore, humanitarianism is 
conceived as the opposite of political 
activity. The two constitute ahierarchi- 
cal binary, the normative character of 
which has the former element carrying 
positive connotations ("humanitarian- 
ism is compassionate, principled, im- 
partial") while the latter is seen in 
negative terms ("politics is cynical, 
amoral, self-interested"). This binary 
logic, moreover, is typically employed 
to explain the "cause and effect" of refu- 
gee flows: on the one hand, it is political 
activity gone too far which creates the 
problem of forced displacement; on the 
other, the effects of these flows raise 
humanitarian concerns and theneed for 
humanitarian action (Cutts 1998,3-5). 
The idea that humanitarianism and 
politics can be somehow kept separate 
and distinct from one another has not 
gone unchallenged.'There is a growing 
recognition for how the politicization of 
humanitarianism (intended or unin- 
tended) is undermining the ability of aid 
workers to act inaneutral and impartial 
manner (Minear and Weiss 1991). To be 
sure, in the context of conflict or crisis, 
the revered principles of neutrality and 
impartiality often simply come to be a 
matter of perspective. For example, hu- 
manitarian organizations invariably 
have to cooperate to some degree with 
governments and intemationalorgani- 
zations, yet their mere association with 
these bodies can damage the perception 
of neutrality. What is more, in cases 
where humanitarian emergencies occur 
within the context of a"po1icy vacuum," 
humanitarianaid workers are often left 
with no other choice but to fill this 
vacuum and become political actors 
themselves (Roberts l996,Sl-M; Vogel 
1996). Finally, as Mark Cutts (1998,4) 
has noted, the extreme logistical chal- 
lenges posed by crisis situations can 
lead to circumstances where "politi- 
cally nai've humanitarian organiza- 
tions are themselves the blame for 
obscuring the real issues of genocide, 
ethnic cleansing and other massive 
human rights abuses, by focusing too 
much c(n issues such as food and medi- 
cal supplies." 
The humanitarian-politics relation- 
ship, however, is much more compli- 
cated than provided for by the 
"politicbation" criticism. This latter 
perspective often remains cummitted to 
a pure, oon-political conception of hu- 
manitalrianism which has not been 
spoiled by a negative interaction with 
political, forces. Many scholars, how- 
ever, have recently suggested that the 
principlp of "humanity," which pro- 
vides bo* the justification and orienta- 
tion of humanitarian action, must be 
reconceived as an inherently political 
concept.For instance, the relationship 
between the principles of state sover- 
eignty aind humanity has been exten- 
sively explored in recent works by 
critical ipternational relations theo- 
rists. In an important study, Andrew 
Linklater (1982) has characterized the 
development of intemational relations 
in terms of a moral conflict between 
claims to citizenship and claims to hu- 
manity. Qoes one place an obligation 
toward humanity and strive for ethical 
universality, or does one privilege the 
duties we have toward fellow citizens 
in a politiqal association and therefore 
settle for e@calparticularity? The mod- 
em practice of international relations, 
Linklater wgues, is predicated on the 
early m o d ~ m  trade-off between "men" 
and "citizqns." The terms of this trade- 
off, classic@y represented in the work 
of Thomas Hobbes (l968), stipulate that 
priority be given to claims of citizenship 
in the partipular political association of 
the state. Yobbes resolves the conflict 
between the universal and the par- 
ticular by positing a theory of state 
sovereignty which allows for one 
intematioqal system with many par- 
ticular statps. Rob Walker (1993,154) 
explains tht+ logic of this citizen/human 
resolution: 
As a reseonse to questions about 
whether 'ye' are citizens, humans or 
somehow both, state sovereignty af- 
firms that we have our primq-of- 
ten over-riding-political identity as 
participants in a particular commu- 
nity, but &ah a potential connection 
with 'huhnity' through participa- 
tion in a brbader intemational system 
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. . . As citizens, we may aspire 40 uni- 
versal values, but only on the /condi- 
tion that we tacitly assume *at the 
world out there is in fad a reglm of 
particular states, of other coqmuni- 
ties each aspiring to some nopon of 
goodness, truth and beauty. 
The modem phenomenon of the 
refugee disturbs this resolutibn to the 
extent that it represents a co;hceptual, 
empirical, and physical brealch in the 
relationship between "hum&&' and 
"citizens." Here, we should recall 
MalWs analysis of humaniWan rep- 
resentations which present rqfugees in 
terms of a "naked or "bard" visions 
humanity. The moral appeifl of such 
conceptions of "humanity" ain force 
from the universal charac f er of the 
shared "human existence" or "bare 
human life" that is common ko all peo- 
ple. For the Italian critic anki theorist 
Giorgio Agamben, howevert, it is pre- 
cisely a human being's bard life-and 
not some social contract or individu- 
al's free will-that functidns as the 
foundation for the state's legitimacy 
and sovereign power: "from the point of 
view of sovereignty only bde life is au- 
thentically political" (Agwben 1998, 
106). From this perspectivd, "human- 
ity "-far from being aneutrd concep t- 
is seen to be inextricably cdnneded to 
our modem understanding of the na- 
ture and location of "the poliitical." Con- 
sequently, the principal reaspn refugees 
constitute a "problem" or "ebnergency" 
totheinternational system bf states lies 
in "the very ambiguity of h j  fundamen- 
tal notions regulating the Wription of 
the native (that is, of life) in the juridical 
order of the Nation-State" (Agamben 
1996,161). Thus, for Agam-, the refu- 
gee phenomenon is a problem which 
must be resolved not within some alleg- 
edlyneutrall'humanitarian space," but 
rather on the terrain of "bibpolitics." 
Foucault (1978,143) employed the 
concept of "biopower" to defer to those 
forces which "brought life and its 
mechanisms into the realtn of explicit 
calculations and made knowledge- 
power an agent of transformation of 
human life." Agamben applies this con- 
cept to Hannah Arendtf$ writings to 
demonstrate how refugees-repre- 
sented as bare human life--are caught- 
up in the "mechanisms and calcula- 
tions" of sovereign power. Arendt 
entitled the chapter in Imperialism 
which addresses refugees, "The Decline 
of the Nation-State and the End of the 
Rights of Man." Agamben suggests we 
continue to take this formulation seri- 
ously for it correctly links "the fate of 
human rights with the fate of the mod- 
em Nation-State in such a way that the 
waning of the latter necessarily implies 
the obsolescence of the former" 
(Agamben 199h, 161). Individuals char- 
acterized by the absence of statist iden- 
tities and communities (i.e., refugees) 
thus bring about a radical crisis to the 
allegedly eternal and universalconcept 
of human rights. As Arendt (1968,179) 
states, 
The conception of human rights, 
based upon the assumed existence of 
a human being as such, broke down 
at the very moment when those who 
professed to believe in it were for the 
first time confronted with people 
who had indeed lost all other quali- 
ties and specific relationships-ex- 
cept that they were still human. 
To explain how this paradox comes 
about, Agamben (1998,128) suggests 
we need to appreciate the way the 
modernstate makesnativity (i.e.,birth, 
naked human life) the "bearer of sover- 
eignty": 
The principle of nativity and the prin- 
ciple of sovereignty [are] irrevocably 
united in the body of the "sovereign 
subject" so that the foundation of the 
new nation-state may be constituted 
. . . The fiction implicit here is thatbirth 
immediately becomes nation such 
that there can be no interval of sepa- 
ration between the two terms. Rights 
are attributed to man (or originate in 
him) solely to the extent that man is 
the immediately vanishing ground 
(who must never come to light as 
such) of the citizen. 
From this perspective, "humanity" is 
already present within the concept of 
citizenship; it appears as the "hidden 
difference" between birth and nation. 
Agamben's point is that refugees make 
what is hidden-i.e., bare l i f ~ o m e  to 
light, thus "unhinging" the state-na- 
tion-territory trinity that conventional 
theories of the state take for granted. As 
the modem political imagination re- 
mains fixated on the citizen as the 
authentic ethico-political identity, it is 
not surprising that refugees (as the ab- 
sence of that identity) are stripped of all 
political agency and deemed tempo- 
rary, "emergency" situations. Indeed, 
Agamben (1998, 133) suggests that 
when humanitarian organizations por- 
tray refugees in the figure of bare human 
life they may "despite themselves, main- y 
tain a secret solidarity with the very 
powers they ought to fight." In the end, 
prevailing "solutions" to the refugee's 
plight focus on returning to refugees 
statist identities so as to restore the con- 
ditions under which they may once 
againenjoy a properly "human" life as 
citizens. 
Conclusion: Emergency or 
Emerging Identities? 
At the same time that refugees are de- 
finedin terms of a "humanitarianemer- 
gency" and thus as an object of ethical 
concern, they are also defined as a crisis 
in international order. Sadako Ogata 
(1998,64) speaks to this point when she 
notes that humanitarian action "to 
bring protection and relief to the victims 
is of course a moral issue at its core, but 
can also have a strategic value in pre- 
serving regional and global stability." 
The wording of the High Commission- 
er's statement is worth reflecting upon 
for itpoints to afundamentalambiguity 
that characterizes conventional multi- 
lateral responses to the phenomenon of 
global refugee flows: what is the rela- 
tionship between a commitment to hu- 
manitarian action on the one hand, and 
to the principles and norms which un- 
derline the "peace, security, and stabil- 
ity" of the international system of states 
on the other? While the first commit- 
ment appeals to a commonhuman iden- 
tity as the basis for multilateral 
humanitarian action, the second directs 
our concern toward maintaining a 
world order which insistsupon citizen- 
ship as the authentic ethico-political 
identity. 
The modem account of the location 
and character of the political continues 
to be powerfully compelling. As this 
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paper has tried to demonstrate, even 
actions residing on the limit of modem 
politics-such-as humanitarian multi- 
lateral cooperation on the refugee 
problem-tend to be, in the end, 
overdetermined by the statist preroga- 
tive to claim the authentic subjects and 
spaces of politics as its own. The hu- 
manitarian ethic in these cases is sub- 
sumed within the logic provided by 
state sovereignty, a logic which already 
posits a resolution between the moral 
obligations we feel toward the one and 
the many, the universal and the particu- 
lar, humanity and citizen-subjects. 
Emergency discourses, however, 
cannot completely control or disarm 
political phenomena which challenge, 
exceed, or simply side-step the limits of 
modem accounts of political space and 
identity. Instead, as Homi Bhabha 
(1994,41) has noted, the "state of emer- 
gency is also always a state of emer- 
gence." There is always some "political 
excess" which allows us to consider 
how a phenomena such as refugees can 
figure into the process of transforming 
world order by virtue of how they "con- 
test borders, put states into question 
(without rendering them irrelevant), 
rearticulate spaces, and reform identi- 
ties" (Campbell 1994,368). Refugee situ- 
ations should therefore be understood 
as complex, multidimensional sites of 
identity practices. Refugee identity is 
not merely the negative, empty, tempo- 
rary, and helpless counterpart to the 
positive, present, permanent, and au- 
thoritativecitizen. Weneed todevelop a 
perspective which is open to the possi- 
bility of political and ethical engage- 
ments which does not reproduce the 
sovereign codes which doom refugees 
to the status of "speechless emissaries" 
(Malkki 1996). Inspiration in this en- 
deavour should obviously be encour- 
aged especially when we are confronted 
with conventional perspectives onrefu- 
gee flows which think that practical and 
operational "solutions" within a state- 
centric discourse are sufficient to under- 
stand this phenomenon. It is only once 
these claustrophobic imaginings of 
world politics are resisted, both in 
theory and practice, that we can begin 
seriously to consider what it might 
mem to bring about Benjamin's "real" 
state of emergency. 
Notes 
1. Compare: Foucault 1973; Bourdieu 1984; 
Butler and Scott 1992; Machiavelli 1979. 
2. The phrase appears in Malkki 1992. 
3. See: http://www.unha.ch/images/ 
4. For a parallel discussion of how the theme 
of emptiness is also found in representa- 
tionsofhomele98people, see Kawash 1998. 
5. Quoted in Cutts 1998,lO. 
6. Quoted in Roberts 1996,55. 
7. A number of academic journals have re- 
cently dedicated special issues on the topic 
of the state and viability of humanitarian- 
ism today.SeeRefugee Survey Quarterly 17, 
no. 1 (1998); Disasters 22, no. 4 (1998); 
Mil1ennium:Journalof International Studies 
27, no. 3 (1998). 
References 
Agamben, Giorgio. 1996. "Beyond Human 
Rights." Trans. CesareCasarino. InRadiual 
Thought in Italy: A Potential Politics, edited 
by Paolo Virno and Michael Hardt. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press. 
-. 1998. Homo Sacec S m e i g n  Power and 
Bare Life. Trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Arendt, Hannah. 1968. The Origins of Totalitari- 
anism. Vol. 2, Imperialism. New York: 
Harvest. 
Benjamin, Walter. 1968. Illuminations. Trans. 
Harry Zohn. New York: Schocken Books. 
Bhabha, Homi K. 1994. TheLocation of Culture. 
New York: Routledge. 
Bourdieu,Pierre. 1984. Distinction:A Social Cri- 
tique of theJudgement ofTaste. Trans. Rich- 
ard Nice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Butler, Judith, and Joan W. Scott, eds. 1992. 
Feminists Theorize the Political. New York: 
Routledge. 
Campbell, David. 1994. "Political Excess and 
theLimitsof theImagination."Millennium: 
A Journal oflnternational Studies 23, no. 2, 
365-75. 
Carlier, Jean-Yves et al., eds. 1997. Who is a 
Re&ee? A Comparative Case Law Study. 
The Hague: Kluwer Law International. 
Cox, Robert W. 1996. "Social Forces, States, 
and World Orders: Beyond International 
Relations Theory." In Approaches to World 
Order, edited by Robert W. Cox and Timo- 
thy Sinclair. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- 
versity Press. 
Cunliffe, Alex. 1995. "The Refugee Crisis: A 
Study of the United Nations High Com- 
mission for Refugees." Political Studies 43, 
no. 2, 278-90. 
Cutts, Mark. 1998. "Politics and Humanitari- 
anism."Refuge Survey Quarterly 17, no. 1, 
1-15. 
~errida.1 ~ a q u e s .  1976. Of Grammatology. 
Trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Balti- 
more: John Hopkins University Press. 
Foucault, Michel. 1973. The Orderof Things: An 
Archmology of the Human Sciences. New 
York: Vintage. 
- 1978. The History of Sexuality. Vol. 1, An 
Introduction. Trans. Robert Hurley. New 
York: Vintage Books. 
Hobbes,Thomas. 1968. Leviathan. Editedby C. 
B. Macpherson. New York: Penguin. 
Jennings, R. Yewdall. 1939. "Some Interna- 
tional Law Aspects of the Refugee Ques- 
tion." The British Yearbook of International 
Law, no. 20,98-114. 
JessemPetersen, Soren. 1998. "Statement to 
the Scurity Council by Soren Jessen- 
Petersen, UNHCR." Refugee Suruey Quar- 
terly 17, no. 1, 65-68. 
Kawash, W a .  1998. "The Homeless Body." 
Public Culture 10, no. 2,319-39. 
Linklater, Andrew. l982.Mm and Citizens in the 
Theoy of International Relations. London: 
MacMillanPress. 
Machiavelli, Niccolb. 1979. The Prince. New 
York: Penguin. 
Mapussan, Warren. 19%. The~earchfor~oliti-' 
cal Space. Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press. 
Malkki, Liisa H. 1992. "National Geographic: 
The Robting of Peoples and the Territoriali- 
zation of National Identity Among Schol- 
ars and Refugees." Cultural Anthropology 
7, no. 1, 2 M .  
- 1996. "SpeechlessEmissaries: Refugees, 
Humanitarianism, and Dehistoriciza- 
tion." CulturalAnthropology l1,no. 3,377- 
404. 
Minear, Larry and Thomas G. Weiss. 1991. 
"Do International Ethics Matter? Humani- 
tarian Politics in the Sudan." Ethics and 
International Afiirs 5,197-214. 
Ogata, Sadako. 1998. "Humanitarian Action 
in Conflict Situations: Statement by the 
HighCQmmisSioner." RtfugeeSurwy Quar- 
terly 17, no. 1, 60-64. 
Roberts, Adam. 1996. Humanitarian Action in 
War. Adelphi Paper no. 305. 
UNHCR. 1W7. Thestateofthe World's Refugees: 
A Humrmitarian Agenda. New York: Oxford 
UniverSity Press. 
Vogel, Tab*. 1996. "The Politics of Humani- 
tarianIritervention." Journal ofHumanitar- 
ian ~ss&ance,3 ~e~tember .  
Walker, R. . J. 1993.lnside/Outside: Interna- 
tional lations as Political Theory. Cam- 
bridge: $ ambridge University Press. 
Warner, D@iel. 1995. "Constructing a Pro- 
ductive Other" [Book Review]. Interna- 
tionalfo~rnal of Wgee Law 7,no.2,371-74. 
Weber, Cynthia. 1995. Simulating Sovereignty: 
Intervenltion, the State and Symbolic Ex- 
change. %bridge: Cambridge University 
Press. d 
Refige, Vol. 17, No. 6 (December 1998) 21 
I 
